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I

INTRODUCTION
The Yalidity of the claims of epistemology depends, like that of any
other such claim, upon verification.

Both Representationists and

ists believe they adequately account for what they maintain.

Perception~

Both verify

what they hold to be an adequate explanation of valid

knowled~e.

cannot be rightJ either one has the true

the other the untrue,

and Yice versa, or both are wrong.

ex~lanation,

But both

But there is consolation in the fact

tha~

they do not concur in all details.
The Representationist holds that t.he perceiTing subject is immediatelr
aware of only subjective states.

These internal objects, states of the mod-

ified self, are present immediately to the Ego.
cations, must have an adequate cause.

These states, data, modifi-

Since these data have a characteris-

tic of externallity, the cause for them must be external.

Only thus indireo•

tly do we know external objects.
The Perceptionist, on the other hand, holds that what is immediately
present to the perceiving subject, is the object being perceived.

That the

self is modified is not denied, but the fact that the self or Ego is immedia•
~ely

aware of this modification, is denied.

~erceived

In other words, the object is

directly by means of the process of perception.

ceived directly, and not the means by which the object is

The object is per~arceivea.

It is evident that a grave disparity exists between the Representationat and the Perceptionist.
is respective position.
~or

It remains to be seen how each of these defends
We shall

~ive,

in the

f.ollo~ing

pages, arguments

both sides, and accept the more practical and most evident.

2

II
?EPRESENTATIONISM
Chapter 1.
Representationistic Appearance of Descartes' Reasoned Realism
The roots of Representationism, like those of other •non-oonforming•l
philosophies, may, presumably, be traced to the reasoned realism of Rene
Descartes.

The reason for this accusation, according to

some~hinkers.

is

the fact that the existence of ideas is prior to the existence of external
objeets, as

t~e

following quotation indicates.

Speaking of the qualities

hardness, heat, light, color, scents, sounds, he says that
•certainly, considering the ideas of all these qualities which
presented themselves to ~ mind, and which alone I perceived
properly or immediately, it was not without reason that I believed mfSelf to perceive objects quite different from Mf
thought, to wit, bodies from which those ideas proceded;•
and he continues with a truth not denied by any Scholastic, and very few
non-Scholastics even find reason to doubt:

•tor I found by experience that these ideas presented theme
selves to me without ~ consent being requisite, so that I
could not perceive any object • • • unless it were present
to the organs of sense. • • • And because the ideas which
I received through the senses were much more lively, more
clear, • • • more distinct than any of those which I could
of myself frame in meditation,. • • it appeared as though
they could not have proceded from my mind, so that they
must necessarily have been produced in me by some other
things. And having no knowledge of those objects excepting
the knowledge which the ideas themselves gave me, nothing
was more likely to occur to my mind than that the objects
were similar to the ideas which were caused.•2
In general, the mind, apart from its essence--thinking thing or substance--has ideas which are clear and distinct(mathematical propositions etc
1~

By •non-conforming• is meant not in total concord with Moderate Realism
generally, and Perceptionism specifically.
2. Meditations on the First Philosophy, Rene Descartes, Med. VI

Besides these there are those effected by imagination and feeling{he means
by •feelingft what in Scholastic ters amounts to sense-per?eption), which
have a characteristic of externality.

According to Descartes, these latter

must be caused by objects external to the body because no better explanation
is available.

It is true that these ideas could have been caused by God.

But since He
•has given me no faculty to recognize that this is the case;
but a very great inclination to believe(that they are sent
to me or) that they are conveyed to me by corporeal objects,
I do not see how He could be defended from the accusation
of deceit if these ideas were produced by causes other than
corporeal objects.•l
So we haYe the mind possessing ideas of external reality.
knows or apprehends only ideas properly and immediatelyf

The mind

B.y means of these

ideas the existence of material and external objects is established.

This

is very definitely a representationistio standpoint.

Mind exists(and in a way functions) independently of matter.
is independent of mind.
of

spannin~.

ex~ended

Body too•

This breach between mind and body does not permit

Obviously, the mind cannot immediately apprehend external and

reality in any form.

Th~refore

the logical and inevitable conclu-

sion is that the mind can apprehend directly only its own affections.s
To discern the remissness of Descartes' theory of knowledge, among
other things, requires no perspicacity.

For a theory of knowledge to be ad..

quate and acceptable the gap between the ideal and the real orders must be
bridged if knowledge is to be of the real order.•
1.
2.
3.
4.

Meditation VI
Meditation VI
New Realism in the
This does not mean
to begin with, all
nal world by means

Light of Scholasticism, Sister Mary Verda, p.S4
that knowledge can be only of external objects. But
knowledge must be grounded in experience of the exterof the senses.

Chapter 2.
Representationistic Aspects of Kant's Transcendental
Idealism or Critical Rationalism
Immanuel Kant's representationism is more obvious if we may use, as
criminating evidence. some of his own specific statements.

i~

The very fact

that critics generally denominate his philosophy as •transcendental idealism." more than implies that external reality and subjective states--the re•
lation between theml.are identified or not adequately accounted for.

But

idealism, as we shall see. is the fate. the inevitable necessity. of any
philosophy which fails to reconcile the two spheres of reality--extramental
and intramental realities--and which fails short of explanation of the origin of the intramental states and their precise relationship with the external realm.
Regarding the knowledge of external objects. which is not knowledge of
external objects as they are in

the~selves,

as Perceptionists hold. he says:

• • • • All our intuition 2 is nothing but the representation
of phenomena; that things which we see are not by themselves
what we see.• so that if we eliminate the subjective form
of our senses. •all qualities. all relations of objects in
space and time. nay space and time themselves. would vanish.
They cannot. as phenomena. exist by themselves, but in us
only.•S
And there can be no question as

to the meaning he attaches to representa-

tiona:
•we have representations within us. and can become conscious
of them; but however far that consciousness may extend. and
however accurate and minute it may be, yet the representations are ·always representations only. that is 6 internal
determinations of our mind.•' ·
1. The relation between subjective states and external reality.
2. By •intuition• Kant means sense-perception.
s. Transcendental Aesthetic of Critique of Pure Reason, I. Kant. second
revised edition of Max Mueller, p.S.
4. Transcendental Analytic. Critique of Pure Reason, P• 161

u

Representations are all we are immediately aware of.

And resentfully.

Kant asks by what right do we add to these representations a reality beyond
that of the subjectivef

By what right has this subjective reality. the rep•

resentation or phenomenon. any reference to an objective reality!
not have because it cannot have.
order.

It does

There is no transcending the subjective

The only objectivity·about any mental phenomenon lies in its being

universal and necessary.

If a representation is judged to be necessary

(there is really no judging taking place. but merely the spontaneity of concepts is unconsciously set into motion) and universal. then. and only then
is it objective.
Prom the way Kant speaks of the object of experience, one would think
that it has being and existence external to the mind.

The contrary.

is true.

For instance. he says

The object is what the mind makes it to be.

howeY~

"And the object
1
can be given only through a certain affection of the mind.• He starts out
that intuition is possible only when the object is given.

well, and ends lamentably.
And then the synthesis of sense experience.
tion of sense-intuitions synthesis is used.
that

~it

In the function or forma-

The synthesis is in the sense

signifies the function whereby the mind unconsciously applies an an

a priori form or category to a datum. and thus constitutes

~experience

by

constructing an object of knowledge.•2
We can see by careful analysis that perception is perception of nothing.
The noumenon is not perceived.

What is perceived is what the mind adds to

1. Transcendental Aesthetic
2. Epistemology, Peter Coffey, p.lBl. Vol. 1.

v

Immediate

the •manifold• of experience from its store of a priori forms.
awareness is possible only of the representation or phenomenon.

That Kant has reversed, theoretically, the process of knowledge, he
openly admits:
"Hitherto it has been supposed that all our knowledge must
conform to the objects: but, under that supposition, all
attempts to establish anything about them a priori, by
means of concepts, and thus to enlarge our knowledge, have
come to nothing. The experiment therefore ought to be made,
whether we should not succeed bet+er with the problems of
metaphysic, by assuming that the objects must conform to
our mode of cognition.•l
So we see, that if the categories, the a priori forms, must be eliminated if
the mind is to conform to objects, and if they be firmly established by objects conforming to them, then the latter alternative must be accepted and
maintained at all costs for the sake of the a priori forms.
In Kant's epistemology there is indeed conformity.
to something else.

But let us see what this is.

of denying conformity of some sort.
and valid knowledge at that.

Something conforms

He perceived the futility

Conformity was essential to knowledge,

Now he is unable to trenscend the ego, the

subjective self, in order to posit the conformity of Perceptionists.
fore there remained no other alternative than the fullowing.
elements in his knowledge, namely mind and its phenomena.

There-

There were twe

If mind construa8e

the objects of knowledge, and this according to constructive principles,

the~

it is natural that there be some correspondence between object and its source
which source is the constructiye mind.

At any rate, the conformity in Kant'1

epistemology is the one of mental appearances or phenomena to mind. 2 It shoull

1. Supplement II, P• 693, Critique, Mueller 1 s 2nd revised edition.
2. Epist., Coffey, Vol. I, P• 197.
John Watson, P• 3.

Also see : The Philosophy of Kant by

7
be clear that whatever qualities--primary or secondary--objects have. the
mind has endowed the objects with those particular qualities. and they are
all that the mind can be immediately conscious or aware of.
Kant advances the following argument to prove that we cannot know objects directly.
•It phenomena were things by themselves(these things-by-them-

selves are objects of direct perception for Scholastics, i.
e. those of them who are Perceptionists). the succession of
the representations of their manifold would never enable us
to judge how that manifold is connected in the objects.•l
This statement is.in entire accord with the later representationists--

J. G. Vance and Roy Wood Sellars--who maintain that we do not perceive the
object directly because of the manifold and various impressions of the same
object on consciousness through the senses.

We shall deal with these later.

In Kant's theory of cognition, knowledge is of a mind-created object.2
There is no possibility of any knowledge beyond what takes place in the mind.
Immediate awareness. therefore, must be of mind products, which in turn are
attributed to objects.

This is clearly a representationistic tenet.

The

representation is of an object. but not a representation in any way similar
to the quality of an external object.

The representation'is attributed to

an extramental object, and the object becomes no more nor less than what is
attributed to it.

In other words, the mind, by means of the a priori con-

cepts, gives the being t o the noumenon. which being it creates for it,(by
~eing

is here meant qualities, all qualities perceivable by the senses. in-

diYidually and collectively).

Thus, Kant. in a sense, may be classed as a

!.Transcendental Analytic, P• 155.
2. Epistemology, Coffey, Vol. 1. PP• 185-186.

0

Representationist. and in every sense. a rationalist in whose theory a priori concepts, innate principles of the pure understanding. occupy a
of prime importance.

positio~

Chapter 3.
Physical Representationism of Thomas Case
Physical representationism is the theory of Thomas Case contained in
his Book: Physical Realism.

This theory is based, from

upon current theories of the physical sciences.

ber,inni~g

Science is

to end,

"F~owledge

at

its best•, and alone is equal to tAe task of disclosing to us the real nature of the qualities of external objects.
Physical Realism proceeds in a manner similar to the following: External objects reveal themselves to us by affecting the organism.

Immediately

apprehended is not the extramental object as it is, but the effect of the
object on the physical organism.

That the object really i.e. actually as a

physical. extended. extramental entity, exists, this science assures us.
The effect of the object takes place within the organism, since the
internal alone is immediately apprehended.

And the physical realist is con-

strained to reason thus: •that since only internal processes can be

ap~re-

hended directly and immediately, the objects existing in the world, and the
woril itself, must be inferred from this internal data.•l
Now these internal data or "effects•, the direct ohjeets of

~pprehen-

sion, the objects of which alone there is immediate awareness, are not paychical in nature.
to so conclude.

The discoveries of science compel the physical realist
These effects, qualities of objects, are states of the

perceiver's organism.

And from these the existence of the external world

is deduced and posited.
•Holding to the logical principle that an inference can pass
only to what is similar in kind. these internal sensible
l.New Realism in the Light of Scholasticism. Sister WAry Verja, p.59

r
data from which external objects are scientifically infer•
red must be physical, not psychical; otherwise effect and
cause would be dissimilar.•l
Since the cause is physical, the effect must be, according to the principle
of similarity of effect to cause.

And we are immediately aware of the ef•

feet, not of the cause, the external object.

We immediately perceive the

effect, the nervous system modified by an external reality.

In other words•

we perceive the effect and infer the cause, the actual physical being.
inconsistency here should be obvious.
effect, is extra-mental.

The

The actual ob,iect, the cause of the

But so is the nervous system as modified and of

which modified nervous system the subject is i~~ediately aware, extramental~
Physical realism, as related to theory of knowledge, is reducible to
physical representationism, and this because of two reasons.

The firet is

the presumption that the physical, the material, alone is real because of
science 1 s attestations.

The second is that the direct object of immediate

apprehension is the effect of the(and direct effect) physical existent external to the self.
physical.

Now since the cause is physical the effect can be only

And this similarity in constitution of cause to effect, is more

than the external object to the phantasm in Scholastic philosophy.

By this

we mean that the similarity in physical content between effect and cause of
the physical realist, and phantasm and the external object of the Scholastic, are not identical.

In the former the two elements are much more physi-

cal than in the latter.

If nothing more, this is at least strongly implied.

Disregarding the details, the physically representationistic propensitl
of Thomas Case is evident, and will become more so after we have considered
some contemporary representatives of representationism.
1. New Realism in the Light of Scholasticism, Sister Mary Verda, PP• 59-60.
2. Epistemology, Coffey, Vol. II, PP• 125-26.

Chapter 4.
Science Ushers in Contemporary Representationism
We have seen that representationism is for the most part due to the •
progress of science.

Its(science's) discoveries and conceptions have exer-

cised considerable influence on philosophic thought.

But to visualize this

influence better it will be well for us to consider some pertinent statementa of one or two scientists themselves, before we commence to evaluate
contemporary representationism, or, what might appropriately be termed
magnanimous idealism.
The first of the scientists we have in mind is no less a personage tha
the physicist, Ernst Mach.

He devoted much time to the analysis of sensa-

tiona, and finally, in an epitomized form, published the volume: The Contributions to the Analysis of Sensations, which embodies the principle phil
osophical ideas of the author as a scientist.
Ernst Mach begins with the assumption that the •ego• exists for •mere
practical necessity.•l Then, •Thing, body, matter, are nothing apart from
their complexes of colors, sounds, and so forth--nothing apart from their
so-called attributes.•2 Thus attributes as mental symbols make up things,
bodies, matter, reality etc.

Then,

••

• • the world consists only of our

sensations • • • • we have knowledge only of sensations.•3 And, • • • • all
bodies are but thought-symbols for complexes of sensations.• 4 In one statement he says that bodies are •thought-symbols• and in another he goes on to
say that •sodies do not produce sensations, but complexes of sensations
(complexes of elements)

rr~ke

up bodies.•

But a fair idea of his theory may

1. Critical Realism by R.W. Sellars, p.29. Scientific progress consists in
ten~ing towards thinking things and away from perceiving them. In other
words, direct concern is with what is within mind. "Science does not
deal with sensible qualities, but with quantities and causal relations.•

!I'"
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~--------------------------------------------------~

be gathered from the quotation:
•we eee "'"' object ~aving a point s. If we touch S, that is,
bring it into connection with our body, we receive a prick.
We can see S, without feeling the prick. But as soon as
we feel the prick we find s. The visible point, therefore
is a permanent fact or nucleus, to which the prick is annexed according to circumstances, as something accidental.
From the frequency of such occurrences we ultimately accustom ourselves to regard all properties of bodies as •effects proceeding from permanent nuclei and conveyed to the
ego through the medium of the body; which effects we call
sensations.•!
The representationism here, though founded on contradiction, seems to
be as follows: The visible point of a needle is a permanent fact or nucleus.
This needle is a needle whether it punctures the epidarmis of my finger or
not.

The pain felt when the finger is pierced is an accident, it is not a

quality of the needle, but the affected nerve in
I can know--the affected nerve.

man experience.

finger; and this is all

illustration is typical of every hu-

All we are immediately aware of is effect; the cause, ·of

course, must exist.
tions.

T~is

~

lmmedi~te

All human experiences are effects, complexes of sensa-

awareness, apprehension, is of these solely.

The conclusion is that the external world is always determined or conditioned by the body.
ernal world.

To changes in the body correspond changes in the ext-

Modified physical organism means substantially modified object

perceived.2 The principle of causality explains this particular interpretation: only the effect is actually and directly perceivable and perceived.
And by this effect the cause is mediately or indirectly perceived.

And from

this is concluded that all effects are qualities of objects.
The representationism of Ernst Mach is evident, although it is less

1. Contributions to the Analysis of Sensations, PP• 9 and 10
2. Idem, PP• 8-10

physical than that of the physical realist.

As we shall see, representation•

ism becomes less physical, and gradually continues in that trend until it
wases identical with idealism, or better, magnanimous idealism.
Ernst Mach's representationism is less physical bece.use, it seel'ls, t,he
effect, the complex of sensation, is less similar to the cause.
of the needle and the pricked finger illustrates well.
pierced I feel pain.

The example

When my finger is

This complex of sensation cannot be found, as such, in

the needle, although the needle caused it. Instead of saying that this representationism is leas physical, a more appropriate designation would be to
term it-the representationism--as less similar, if at all, to the cause, in
contrast to the precision in similarity of effect to cause in the representionism of Thomas Case.
Before closing, we must note one grave error in lmch 1 s proceedure.
Speaking of the sharp object, he says: •we see an object having a point

s.•

This certainly implies direct and immediate perception of this object.

It

seems to indicate that the object is known and perceived, and not, as he
maintains, the sensation of perception.

There is nothing to indicate, on

seeing this particular object, that the perception, the sensation, the complex of sensation, is directly perceived and the caused inferred.
Whatever be the final judgment, we may conclude that Mach's representations are less similar to their causes than the representations of Case.
the former, pain ought to exist in the perceiving subject.
ed by a needle.

In

The pain is caus•

In the latter(Case), if followed through logically, the pah

the sudden discomfort, ought to exist in the needle.
Another representative scientist we wish to note is A.
We shall treat of him in the following chapter.

s.

Eddington.

r
Chapter s.
Representationism of Arthur Stanley Eddington More Emphatic
We have in A. S. Eddington what naturally results from a scientist suddenly turning philosopher.

He holds that when

•an image or sensation arises in the brain• it "cannot purport
to resemble the stimulus which excites it. Everything known
about the material world must in one way or another have been
inferred from these stimuli transmitted among the nerves."
In order to arrive at knowledge,
"The mind as a central receiving station reads the dots and
dashes of the incoming nerve-signals. By frequent repetition of their call-aignals the various transmitting stations
of the outside world become familiar. We begin to feel
quite a homely acquaintance with 2LO and SXX. But a broadcasting station is not like its call-signals; there is no
commensurability in their nature.•
This, it should b"' clee.r. :i.s identical with what Ernst Mach convincedly proposes.

And then he

~tinues:

•so too the chatia and tables around us which broadcast to
us incessantly those signals which affect our sight and
touch cannot in their nature be like unto the signals or
to the sensations which the signals awake at the end of
their journey.~
Here too, we have causes and effects.

The extended object external to the

perceiving subject "incessantly• is making impressions upon the senses.
These extramental objects only "broadcast • • • signals• which are unlike the
object sending them.

The •stirring of consciousness• by sensation and by

image, and

r~sulting

•stor7•. 2

We are far from being immediately conscious of what nature is en-

in knowledge. only •transmutes the whole• of nature's

deaYouring, by its broadcasts, to actually communicate.

What is received is

1. Science and the Unseen World, A. S. Eddington, pp.34-36
2. Idem, P• 38

so distorted that it disfigures the real; no resemblance exists between the
object and what it produces in the organism.
This is the world science reveals:
•That environment of space and time and matter. of light and
colour and concrete things. which seems so vividly real to
us is probed deeply by every device of physical science and
at the bottom we reach symbols.~l
Again we have here relegated to imwediate apprehension what is revealed
upon introspection and reflection only.

Reflection. reflection alone.

shows that the process of cognition exists. ·The object is known by means
of sensation, but the

se~s~tion ~ever

reaches the level of consciousness

where it becomes object of immediate awareness. 2
Science has made many valuable contributions to every field of endeavour.

But it has added very little, if anything, to theory of knowledge.

When we perceive objects we still perceive them directly.

Neither the ob-

ject nor the subject have been changed by discoveries of modern science.
We continue to apprehend immediately and perceive directly.

1.

Science and the Unseen World. A. S. Eddington, P• 37.

2.

Elements of

Epistemolo~•

J. T.

B~rron,

pp. 106-107

r
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III

THE

REPRESENTATIONI~M

OP

C~ITICAL ~~ALISM

Chapter 1.
Representationism of Roy Wood Sellars
Critical Realism is a contemporary school of philosophy, which, we
might say, is the natural result of scientific progress.

Scientific disco.-

aries have dissuaded modern non-conforming philosophers to such an extenl
as to reject idealism together with intuitive realism, e.nd to propound a Yia
media, which of course amounts to nothing short of objective idealism(by objective idealism here is meant: all the ego can know

im~'Jediately

jective state which is the effect of an extramental cause).

is the sub-

We shall now

attempt to present this via media, or representationism proper.
We have seen that A. S. Eddington held that perception was of signs or
symbols.

That is the word of a scientist.

Now Sellars agrees and says that

science perceives only signs or symbols which require conceptual interpretation.

•science does not deal with sensible qualities, but with quantities

and causal relations." He remarks that scientists are pretty generally agree•
that things as perceived are different from what lies behind the perception
or appearance. 1

In other words, we are aware of perception directly, but

not of object.

• • • • perception is a mediate process and not an event in

which the thing is revealed as it is."

And as criticism of Natural Realism

he says: Natural Realism is "not a theory of what takes place, but a statement of what appears to take place.•

•natural Realism is the philosophy

dominant even among philosophers when they are not in a reflective mood.• 2
The Natural Realist is in error because perception is a mediate process.

1.

Critical Realism, R.W. Sellars, P• 41.

2.

Idem, PP• 1-6.

r
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But we shall see that the "reflective mood" adds nothing to perception: it
only brings to light what is never perceived.

But the question under dis-

cussion is not what reflection reveals, but what is perceived.
His foremost argument against Natural Realism is the fact that •Perception has conditions which do not appear in that which is

i~nediately percei~

ed.• 1 Therefore perception is not valid, but very fallible.
tion is ordinarily not expected of a philosopher.

Such a conten-

If our senses revealed

all conditions, all qualities, and every possible percept the object is cap•
able of conditioning(this of course is not direct), there would be no need
for our higher faculties.
Of no meagre importance, with Sellars, is •The lack of concommittant
variation between percepts and things.•

By lack of •ooncommittant variatioD

he has in mind the fact that at a distance of a few feet I perceive an objet
of a certain size.
much smaller.

At a much greater distance this same object is perceived

In other words the variation in

~

percepts does not corres-

pond to the object. because the object does not vary, while my percepts do.
Professor Stout is quoted as exemplyfying this thus: •If anything X
exhibits variations which are not shared by Y, X and Y must be distinct existences."! But Mr. Sellars frustrates his position by the following counteractiont •we constantly have to discount our percepts by means of past experience in order not to be misled."

But we must be misled because past

experience toe is by percept, or appearance, or dependent upon them.

But

he continues: "There can be no doubt that we must go beyond present physical
1.

Critical Realism, R.W. Sellars, p. 7.

2.

Idem, p. 12.

stimuli to account for percepts.
is peraona1.•1

The past is somehow active, and the past

If the past is personal, how can we avoid being misled? This

avoidance is impossible; deception is inevitable.
To discount appearances. percepts, by reference to the past, implies
the existence of a real, actual something in the past that is not an appearance.

Certainly, to discount appearance by appearance is no more acceptable

than the acceptance of the last appearance as true.
And in this same trend of thought, insisting that the present percept.
in order to become veridical, must be compared with the past: •Truth, so far
as the percept is concerned, lies behind us instead of hefore us." 2 But this
we have indicated to be erroneous.
However, he endeavours to substantiate the tenet that the percept partakes of truth only after having been discounted by the percepts of the past
(He does not say that the present percept is discounted by a past percept,
but this is strongly implied).
Only qualities of objects, which qualities •lend themselves to mathematical and physical analysis" are capable of being described and explained
accurately.

"The primary dimensions of things and processes, such as exten-

sion, movement, mass and energy, can be used for the purpose of exact description and explanation because they are measurable and lend themselves to
mathematical and physical analysis.

For this reason results can be obtainea

which are not variable from moment to moment as is the case with ·Lhe secondary qualities."! This is very similar to the earnest contention of T. Case!
~,

1.

z.

Critical Realism, R.W. Sellars, p.27. In this connection is rertinent
r.ew ryealism in the Light of Scholasticism, Sister M.Verda.
Crit. Real. R.W.Sellars, PP• 12-16.
Idem, p. 16.

.1V

But wherefrom invariable results?

Every sort

based on perception, thing-experiences.
appearances are not to be relied upon.

o~ scienti~io

experience is

But these are appearances, and
The percepts are objects of immedi-

ate awareness; but percepts are unstable.
That the primary qualities are stable and measurable. is due to sense
perception directly revealing the object perceived.
ities are not stable, neither are the primary.

If the secondary qual-

He relegates the secondary

qualities to the personal side, qualities perceived with the "perceptual
perspective."

But he does not evade the fact that qualities. whether prim-

ary or secondary, are founded on direct perception.
The principle of causality is employed to account for the effects dire•
ctly perceived: "• •• things are there where we judge them to be;
but we do not perceive them. Instead, we perceive
the percepts causally connected with them. a.nd these
percepts are spatially and temporally more directly
related to the brain than to the things with which
we ordinarily identify them.~l
As for the percept being real, and apprehension of extramental object
being direct,--these are impossibilities if •to be real is to be susceptible
of being perceived or of affecting that which is susceptible of being perceived.•2 In other words everything must be real that the human being cannot
reach.

Reality is inapproachable to the percipient subject.

The represen-

tationism here portrayed should be evident.
We
pher.

w~st

conclude that Professor Sellars is both scientist and philoso-

This seems to be a disparagement to either pretention.

To attain to

the truth which any branch of knowledge has to offer, invariably specialization is required.

Otherwise the Adage: "Jack of all trades, master of non•

is worthless, devoid of meaning and application.
1. Critical Realism, R.W. Sellars, P• 14.
2. Idem, p. 29.
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Chapter 2.
Instrumentalism of Jehn Dewey is Representationistic
To leave no doubt as to the scientific influence. basis. of representationism. the philosophy of a scientist • as specifically related to
theory of knowledge. ot the calibre of John Dewey must be mentioned.
With John Dewey •consciousness • • • denotes awareness or perception
of meanings.•
change.

The subject-matter of awareness is things in process of

Awareness means attention to events taking place in mind.

are •events-with-meanings."

Objects

His representationism is vivid in the follow-

ing: Real objects •signify the cause of certain qualitative and immediate

effects.•

The instrumenta1istic rapresentationism is contained in: •.

..

things • • • that later come to be known. are primarily not objects of
awareness. but causes of weal and woe. things to get. others to avoid."
He too. uses the principle of

c~usel:'i.ty:

•The conscious or perceived affair

is itself a consequence of antecedent conditions.• 1
aware of an effect in the mind.
object.

~e are immediately

This effect is caused by an extramenta1

There is not so much a relation of effect to cause. as there is of

the effect to future action.

What we immediately apprehend is the cause

of action to be experienced.

Direct and immediate apprehension of eztra-

mental entities is not to be found in Instrumentalism.

1.

The Philosophy of John Dewey. Joseph Ratner
Essays in Experimental Logic. pp. 94-95. 176-118.
Experience and Nature. PP• 122-123.

r

Chapter 3.
Final Consideration of Representationism
The representationist claims that what makes us feel we are in direct
contact with external reality in perception, is •curious pertinacious biasR,
•unconscious objective biasK, •natural objective bias•, •strong pathetic
belief."l

John G. Vance says that only a group of sensations is immediate-

ly given.

He maintains:

"I look outward, inward, upward and find no more than sensations,
feelings, thoughts, desires, or imagery of some kind--all
psychic events at best. What am I to myself, in fact, but
an ever-changing group of psychic occurrences!•2
We are aware of sensations and other states of mind.

Beyond these we

cannot reach:
"Beyond these phenomena, of sensation and thought, whether
they be reliable or not, or what comes to the same, beyond
the presentational order we may never pass. Without hinting
obliquely at any Kantian limitation of knowledge it is
cleaer that we may never !Row more of things than we find
within our consciousness.•
He struggles to avoid idealism, but this is impossible if subject is directly aware only of his mental states.
In final analysis, Representationism holds: knowledge is a three term
relation.

There must be a subject; there is an object; and between these

two there is what they designate "datum", "essence", logical, •neutral
entity,• and "character-complex.•
1.

Reality and Truth, John G. Vance, pp. 1-3

2.

Idem, p. 14.

3.

Idem, P• 166.

•Perception

is, • • • imagining character-complexes out there in the

world, together with an implicit attribution of existence.•1

In perception

•we do • • • immediately grasp or apprehend • • • outer objects.
is a logical, essential, virtual grasp.• 2
apprehension of object.
mental state.
none.

But it

Therefore there can be ne uirect

This does not mean that the apprehension is of a

The mental state has ontological existence.

•There do exist, in or in intimate connection

~ith

The datum has
the

~rain,

a

series of "mental states,• which have the qualities which make our data

appear.•~

The datum is not the mantel state.

It cannot be because mental

states vary with individuals; essences, data, character-complexes do not.

c.

A. Strong interestingly elaborates on the datum:
" • • • the datum is the logical essence of the real thing.
By •essence• I mean its~ divorced from its ~--its
entire concrete nature, including its sensible character,
but not its existence.•4

The data are not actual external existences; they are not internal or
psychical existences "either representative of the external ones or non-representative.•

They are logical entities and not "identifiable with

the things we perceive, but are only the detached concrete natures or
•essences• of those things.• 5
1.

Essays in Critical Realism by Durant Drake, Arthur o. Lovejoy,
James B. Pratt, Arthur Rogers, George Santayana, Roy Wood Sellars,
and C. A. Strong. p. 23

z.

Idem, p. 2&.

3.

Idem, P• 26

4.

Idem,

5.

Idem, PP• 223-224;
Descartes held primary qualities to be extramentally real, while
of secondary qualities he had "confused and obscure" ideas. Coffey,
Epistemology, Vol. II, PP• 139-140.

•nata are presentments of objects from the point of view of the organism, they are not objects themselves.• 1

"In short, when we speak of any-

thing as a •datum," that which makes it a datum, the giveness, is not given
along with the thing.

It is an external denomir1ation, it consists in a

relation between the thing given and something else.•2
between the giveness and awareness lies the datum.

Somewhere in

There is no direct

contaot either between object and datum or awareness and object.
Professor Strong holds that if the datum were existent, an epistemological dualism would be unavoidable.

The datum must be continuously

existent: if the datum were not continuously existent, we would have
representationism, says Professor Strong.
Data are not existences, but universals, the bare natures of objects.
Since they are universals, they can have only one existence.

As far as

the percipient subject is concerned, all he does is affirms the existence
of real things.

The universal is a sort of continuum the existence of

which the subject recognizes.
Joseph Thomas Barron comments on the datum:
"The datum is the essence(or character-complex) which through
perception is taken to be a character of the perceived object. The latter causes the appearance of certain character-complexes in the percipient subject. These character
complexes are the data--the objects of lwareness in the
percipient subject--which are projected 3 by the subject into
the extramental wjrld, or which are imagined to be in the
objective world." 4

1. Essays in Critical Realism by Durant Drake et al. P• 226
2.

Idem, p. 228.

3.

By projected is meant recognized or the "real" thing affirmed.

4.

Elements of Epistemology, J.T. Barron, PP• 161-162 •.

This

~something

else" is the subject

e~o,

or "I•.
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And if perception is to be true, these data must be identical with the

qualities of the perceived object.
Error in perception is due to the fact that data are dependent on the
individual organism.

The data Yary •in their character with the consti-

tution of the sense-organs and the way in which these are affected."

Only

secondarily and indirectly are data affected by the external object. The
follofing quotation illucidates:
• • • • We have no power of penetrating to the object itself
and intuiting it immediately, but are dependent for our information concerning it on the effects which it is able to produce within the body. In a word, data are subject to the
law of psychophysical correlation.•l
Thus we see that the datum obstructs direct perception of the external
universe.

T"le

ex~erne,l

object of perception becomes the Kantian noumenon

and the object perceived becomes only the content of perception.
If all that the percipient subject is immediately conscious of is the
appearance or representation, how does he know that it is an appearance or
a representation?

If this is followed logically, the answer is negative--

he can never know.

And if from immediate awareness of psychic states, we

infer, by principle of causality, existence of a real ceuse, en extramental world, how can this be established?
it cannot be established.

The answer again must be negative--

The best that can be done is to hold(if the sub-

ject or ego is immediately aware of conscious states, psychic events) that
the self or ego causes them.

How can I know the cause to be external if I

never perceive dir&ctly, or immediately apprehend, the object of which I
i~ediately

1.

aware?

~

If I am aware or apprehend directly, only of data within

Essays in Critical Realism, D. Drake et al., p. 225
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me. the only explanation. i.e. logical explanation, is that the present
data were caused by
firmly cnnt.ends

th~t

~self,

the ego or aelf.

But

the representationist

the representation is not of the subject's creation.

It is solely experience from which we learn t.hat effects must be
produced by causes. that effects are similar to the causes which produce
them.

And this experience is direct perception, i.e. causes and effects

have their foundation in direct apprehension ot external objects.

If not,

then the •self" constructs appea.rances or representations, of which the
self is directly conscious.
Just why do the representationists deny the self-evident facts of
perception?

The reason is the lack of "concommittant variation• between

the object as it is and the percepts of the object as experienced by the
perceiving subject.

They are willing to accept immediate perception if

changeable perceptions of the same object can be accounted for. (They are
aware of the irrefragability of the senses.
interpretation of the facts science presents.

What they need is a correct
This PERCEPTIONISM!, as far

as is possible w:ith the discoveries of science. the constitution of the
human organism, and the ability of the human mind to interpret to the
extent feasible. adequately does.

In the following pages we shall present

the more evident views of the theory of PERCEPTIONISM, and shall endeavor

to show the futility of such a theory as RZPRESENTATIONISM, and the needlessness of the latter.

IV
:rERCEPTIONISM

Chapter 1.
Representationism Summarized
For the sake of convenient comparison we present here in summarized
form the salient features of Pepresentationism.

Representc.tionism is the

theory maintaining
"that the non-Ego, as distinct from the Ego, is not a primitive datum of consaious e.wareness; that only the Ego is
apprehended first and immediately; that from its data there
is evolved and mediated a conscious discrimination or distinction between a non-Ego and the Ego, and a spontaneous belief
in the distinct reality of the former. This position is
variously described as Representationism, or the Theory of
Mediate or Representative or Inferential Sense Perception.•!
External reality produces a mental image or what is known as a representation, in the subject perceiving.
sciousness.

Tr.e image is immediately present to con-

Apprehension is directly of this representation(or image).

lind external reality is perceived through this representation. 2

In other

words, external reality is mirrored, represented in representation, and

by inference from the representation, external reality is established as
existent.

This extended, external reality is apprehended through the in-

ternal data or objects of direct awareness.
ed to the real qualities and Mt.ure of

This subjective data is referr•

re~Hty

by the principle of causal-

ity and the principle of similarity of effect to cause.
course, does this referrin,.

The mind, of

This, in general, is what Representationism

ardently proferrs as substitute for both idealism and intuitive realism.
f!e see in this mediate perception that the object does not, at any time
reach the level of consciousness, is never directly apprehended.

The sub-

ject is immediately aware of data, which result from the process of percep1. and 2. See following page.

~·

tion.

The data are the means by which the objeet is known.

data are apprehended directly. and the object indirectly.
object is solely what is inferred from the medium or data.

1.

Epistemology, Peter Coffey, Vol. II, p. 40.

2.

Idem, p. 66.

But the
Knowledge of

Chapter 2.
The Theory of Perceptionism
rereeptionism is the theory of immediate or intuitional or presentative perception.

According to this theory

"the species sensibilia expressa, the whole mental modification and process, with its resulting state or condition,
is only the means by which the external thing is directly
presented to and consciously apprehended by the perceiver:
the process is not constructive of a mental object which
would be itself first apprehended, and in and through which,
as an image or representation, the represented external
reality would be mediately apprehended. The mente.l or
psychic effect of the action of the external reali t.y on the
mind, and of the mental reaction thereto, does not itself
come into consciousness or become an object of direct awaraness.111
This "psychic effect" exists, but it reaches consciousness only upon
reflection and introspection.

It is only the means which enables the

subject to apprehend the object directly.

In the act of perception,

excluding the possible immediate awareness of phantasms or ment.8.1
images, "it.is the external reality itself(i.e. some phase or aspect of
it) that is • • • immediately present to, and apprehended by, the perceiver." 2
The chief argument against this theory, of the representationist,
is that direct perception of the qualities(whether primary or secondary)
cannot be direct for the reason that: sense qualities exist only in the
subject because the object perceived produces "vibratory motions of the

air or aether" which the subject apprehends immediately as qualities of
the object, using the principle of causality to substantiate the con1.

~pistemology, ~eter

2.

Idem, P• 67.

Coffey, Vol.!!, P• 66.
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tention.

These "vibratory motions of the air or aether" stimulate the

human organism, resulting in data denominated as representations of
qualities of extramental reality by the principle of causality.

The

physical effect of these vibrations is what the subject perceives as
the several qualities of external objects.

The data or representations

of qualities in the extra-subjective realm of existence, are •specifically determined in the perceiver by the influence of the external
reality."

But the real proper and common sensibles as determining the

actually existent object external to the subject, are not univocal wihh
the data or representations.

But they

~

analogous to the external

qualities because the data •are cognitive representations produced in
the mind by the external material qualities.•

If this be so, the

actual qualities existing in the external object independently of perception, must, in Kant's sense, be noumena--things-in-themselves--which
forever remain unknowable.

To cite Jeanniere for specific exemplifi-

cation, we have:
"A thing cannot be known by the (consciously, directly apprehended) impression it produces; for (a) the impression is
not the thing; (b) nor is it an effect that faithfully expresses(or represents or mirrors) the thing; for (c) it is
an effect received by(or wrought in) the(conscious) subject
and received conformably with the mode of being of the latter(secundum modum recipientis). Wherefore there is no
relation of resemblance between the impression and the thing.•l
With the perceptionist •resumblance• between object and phantasm, or
between object and idea, is revealed upon reflection and introspection.
In perception there is no resemblance. The object is perceived directly
and apprehended simultaneously; apprehension and perception are direct
1.

Quotation from Jeanniere in Epistemology by P• Coff'ey, P• 72.

and immediate.
The perceptionist holds that when an object is before him, and his
faculty of perception is normal (abiding by the laws of perspective), he
perceives the object directly and immediately.
object directly.

He is conscious of the

He does not deny the existence of media.

aether exists and intervenes.
not alter perception any.

It may be vibrating too.

The air or

But that does

Then there is the existence of the datum.

But the datum or phantasm or image, does not make perception indirect or
mediate.

The air, the phantasm, and all else existing and brought into

existence during perception,(e.g. the affected nervous system, the
brain etc.)--these the subject does not become aware of until he reflects.
He is aware directly and immediately of the object.
The datum of the Representationist exists likewise for the Perceptionist.

But the datum(whether vibratory motions of the air or aether.

or affected nervous system. or change in perspective of the object
perceived). is not directly and immediately perceived.
exists, who will deny?

That the datum

But that it exists as object of immediate aware•

ness. the perceptionist firmly and justifiably denies.

The facts of

perception present to immediate awareness, or in immediate apprehension,
the object as it is.

Wh.en I see a red apple, it is a red apply I am

immediately aware of; I apprehend immediately a red apple.
by which I apprehend the red apple immediately. exists.

The medium

But it does not

reach the point of consciousness until I reflect upon the medium.
not aware of the medium until I reflect upon it.

I am

What I am directly

and immediately conscious or aware of is the red apple.

Upon reflecting

I find that a medium exists and plays its part during the process of percaption.

I find that during the process of perception the medium is the

means by which I immediately and directly apphrend or perceive the red
apple.
If the perceptionist can account re,.srm .. bly and accurately for
absence of •concommittant variations• in certain perceptions(this absence
of "concommittant variations" is the fundamental argument of the representationist against both idealism and presentative realism). he nullifies
the chief contention of mediate perceptionists. and tota.lly destroys
faith in representationism.

Thii the perceptionist does with facility

simply by appealing to reason with the facts available.
On perceiving a straight stick lying on the ground. I spontaneously judge it to be a straight stick because the sense presents it so.
perceive a straight stick.
appears crooked.
appears.

I

Now this same stick immersed partly in water

I immediately judge it to be crooked, because it so

Yet I know the stick is straight.

This is what the represen-

tationist cannot account for: the same stick appearing straight at one
time, crooked at another time.
The answer to this spurious difficul+y iA

th~t

there are conditions

in perception which must be taken into account.
•Reflection on the facta of sense experience, on our spontaneous judgments regarding the immediate data of sense,
and particularly on the occasional illusions or deceptions
or erroneous interpretations of which we are the victims.
convinces us that we can rely on these spontaneous judgments
only when the whole conscious process takes place under normal conditions, and that we can, by attending to the actual
conditions. either at the time or at least by reflection
after the fact, either forestall or correct erroneous
spontaneous interpretations. These conditions are partly
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on the side of the perceiver and partly on the side of
the perceived datum or object.•l
And the requisite conditions are: a) the perceiver must be mentally and
physically in a sane and healthy condition.

He must be able to distin-

'uish between datum of perception and datum of imagination.

The sense

organ must be free from disturbing and abnormal conditions. in order to
present datum as it is presentable under normal conditione.

b) The

external datum: spatial and physical conditions of object under perception. and the same conditions of the medium between object and
percipt.ion agent or percipient subject must be normal.

These condi-

tions are essential if perception is to be perception of what actually
is.

If conditions do not change. the perception of a straight stick

will be always a straight stick.

It is obvious that a straight stick

lying on the ground at one moment. and then immersed in water at another moment. cannot appear the same under the varying conditions.
The stick is the same. but the conditions are not constant.

This

sufficiently accounts for the much preached absence of •conoommittant
variation.•
Our perceptions of an object are not necessarily always the same.
fhe very fact that senses are used prohibits identical perceptions of
an identical object.

The sense organs determine percept.ion to e con-

siderable extent.
But if perception is determine« by conditions of the subject's
sense organs, now can the senses report truth, i.e. how can the percept
correspond to the object of which it is the percept?
1.

Epistemology, Peter Coffey, Vol. II, PP• 95-96.

The answer is

ss
contained ina
•when all the conditions of an actual external perception
are normal. the qualities of the presented sense datum can
be rightly affirmed of the perceived external reality. inasmuch as those qualities are qualities of this reality
as normally presented to consciousness. It does not imply
that those qualities, presented to consciousness. are wholly independent of the determining influence of the sense
organs. It recognizes that in all perception the quali•
ties of the presented sense datum are partially determined
to be what they are by the organic nature or structure and
conditions of the perceiver's own material or corporeal
sense organs. through the instrumental functions of which
the external reality is presented to the individual perceiver1s consciousness.•l
The following sentences are

~xtremely

important to the solution of

the problem which sense-organic-determinations of datum bring about:
•But when these organic determining factors. on the subjective or •salt• side of the process, are normal. and. bei~g
normal. are the same for all normal individual perceivers.
their determining influence on the qualities of the external reality presented through their operation is not indeed
denied. for it is undeniabl•, but is tacitly and rightly
ignored as being something essentially involved in the subjective, organic side of the presentation of external re~l
ity to the perceiver's mind or consciousness. Hence the
individual perceiver abstracts from this presupposed, uniform influence of his own organic nature as a sentient being.
on the reality which he perceives, when he • • • judges this
reality to be as it is presented.•2
In other words, the continuous and normal influence of the organism,
influence experienced by all normal individuals, upon the datum may be
•ignored•.

Thus perception is valid in spite of the determining in-

fluence of the sense organs.
Because of the normality of these determining factors, their ine~itable

participation in the process of perception. perception becomes

1.

Epistemology, P. Coffey, Vol. II, pp. 95-110.

2.

Idem, p. 98.

necessarily direct and immediate.

We ignore the normal influence.

ignore what we are not immediately aware of.
far as perception is concerned.

We

This includes the datum as

The datum is revealed only upon reflec-

tion; so are the influences of the organism.

In perception we are not

conscious of the influence of the sense organs. neither of the datum.
What we perceive directly and immediately. and consciously. is the exter•
nal object as it is.
Perception must be direct if knowledge of object perceived is to be
valid.

If perception is other than direct. knowledge. valid knowledge.

of external object is absolutely impossible.

But even the pepresenta-

tionist will admit he has valid knowledge. certitude.

What truth-value

would there be to e.n idea if the percept from which it is abstracted
were not an accurate

representation of the extramental object?

None.

Even lack of •concommittant variation" in perceptions does not
invalidate the theory of perceptionism.

When I perceive the straight

stick I apprehend it directly and immediately. and spontaneously judge
it to be straight.

I cannot perceive in any other way.

it as it appears to the sense of vision.

I must see

After the stick has been

immersed in water. I perceive directly and immediately the stick as
crooked.

I must perceive it thus because that is the way in which it

appears to me under those conditions.
senses present the stick to me.

And that is the way in which the

There is no error involved because the

senses do not err because they do not judge. Error lies solely in judgment.

And the senses only present what is before them; they do not

judge. therefore they do not err as the representationist would have us
believe.

3li

The perceptionist, as Scholastics generally hold, says NIHIL EST IN
INTELLECTU QUOD NON PRIUS FUERIT

I~

SENSU.

The representationist reverses

this and says:- NIHIL EST IN SENSU QUOD NON PRIUS FUERIT IN INTELLECTU.
That is, of course, presuming that the datum involves the intellect.
Representationists, taken as a whole, are mediate perceptionists. a
typical exponent of this group says: " • • • perception is a mediate process and not an event in which the thing is revealed as it is." 1 Another
spokesman for this group, but speaking in differnt words, says: • • • •
we, once stimulated from without, draw our appreciation of what things
are from within. 2

Mediate perception with the representationist menas

that the object of direct and immediate awareness, apprehension, is the
datum.

From the datum, using the principle of causality, or the prin-

ciple of similarity of effect to cause, the external object is inferred.
Thus it is maintained that. t.hie
But mediate perception?

e~ternal

object is mediately perceived.

This is a contradiction in terms.

Supposing the above few sentences to be true for the moment, the
representationist has this difficulty to solve: In every mediate perception reason is an indispensable factor.

But animals have no reason.

Therefore animals have no mediate perception.

Since an human being

~us

his rationality, is identical with an animal, anhuman baing has no mediate
perception.

If perception is not mediate, there is no other alternative,

as far as is known to philosophy up to the present time, than that
perception is immediate.

It is generally agreed that animals have no

1.

Critical Realism, Roy Wood Sellars.

2.

Reality and Truth, J. G. Vance, p. 212.

faculty of reasoning.
no reason.
power.

th~

Yet they perceive.

Now if they perceive and have

must perceive immediately since they have no reasoning

And in human perception no reason is utilized.

beings must perceive immediately.

~en

Therefore human

a human perceives. he must perceive

directly and immediately the object external to him.

(We are only speak-

ing of perception of objects external to the perceiving subject.)
Every human action has a direct stimulus or cause.

This stimulus

or cause immediately precedes the effect or action following.

Thus, if

the representationist position is to be accepted, it necessarily follows
that when a child reaches for the moon. he ought to reach into the head
because that is where the object he desires is immediately apprehended.
The datum is the thing the child reaches for because that is what he perceiYes immediately.

The absurdity is &laring.

Or for instance, when

a horse is approaching a water trough, why does he move towards itt

If

representationism is true, the horse ought to try and break entrance into
the place of existence of the datum.

For

t,h~t

iately and that is what he is tending towards.

ie"'whet he perceives immedCertainly the represen-

tationist will not say that the horse infers the existence of the external trough by the principle of causality.

It is extremely evident that

representationism must step aside to make room for perceptionism.

To

tell the truth. it does not need to step aside for it never held any position in actual life and experience.

If representationism were true,

human progress would indeed be considerably hindered, for, if nothing more,
time is required to perceive the datum and then to infer the object.
Whereas in perceptionism no time element is appreciated.

v

CONCLUSIOB
We have seen that the object, in perception, is immediately and directly apprehended, and not the datum, the means by which the object is
immediately and directly apprehended.
of perception exists.

The datum exists end the process

But these never reach the level of consciousness

until the subject wills to consider them in reflection.

Perception of

an object must be direot because no reason is involved in the process.
The representationist claims that his theory is based on the found•
ation of scientific discoveries.

It is true that science has contributed

much in physics, in chemistry, to physiology in the analysis of sense
organs, the nervous system, the brain, also to psychology, and to all
other physical sciences.
tically nothing.

It has added nothing to the subject; nothing to

Where its contributions do come in is in the

the subject and object.

~dium

between

But this medium never reaches immediate aware•

ness in the process of perception.

Whether science has enlightened us

as to the medium or not, perception is still direct and
object.

Prac-

Science has added nothing to enable us to understand

perception differently.
the object.

But what has it done for philosophy!

im~edi~te

of the

Science has revealed many interesting facts about the constitu•

tion of the object, but this does ngt alter immediate perception of the
same object; it adds nothing.
apprehend a red apple.

When I perceive a red apple I immediately

That science has discovered vitamins which were

not known twenty years ago, makes no differance in my direct and immediate
apprehension of the red apple.

Or that this same apple is seventy•five

to eighty-five per centum water(75-84.6 per cent.), contains three-tenths

SE

per centum(0.3 per cent.) ash, four tenths per centum(O., per cent.)
protein, one and two tenths per centum fiber(l.2 per cent.), thirteen
per centum arbohydrate(l3.0 per cent.), and five tenths per centum fat
(0.5 per cent.), does not in the least modif1 or transform
tion of a red apple.

mw

percep-

These are very important discoveries in many res-

pects, but despite them, I still perceive directly and immediately a
red apple.
perception.

These facts of science are not immediately apprehended in
Therefore the contributions of science neither remove nor

add anything, from and to, my direct perception of the red apple.
These just mentioned are facts pertaining to the object of my perception.

Science has contributed much to our knowledge of the medium

existing between the object and the perceiving subject.

So far as percep-

tion is concerned, this knowledge is never directly apprehended; those
facts never reach consciousness during the process of perception.
This is evident to unbiased consideration.
The representationists try hard to evade the stigma of idealism.
But so long as they maintain that only the datum is immediately perceived,
they must accept the penalty.

If only the datum, essence, the character-

complex, is immediately apprehended, reality of which the datum is a
representation, must forever remain unknown and unknowable.
The representationist admits everything

that the peroeptioniAt re-

cognizes; he lives and acts just as the latter lives and acts.
interprets the facts erroneously.

But he

Be apprehends immediately only the

datum, and to avoid being considered an idealist, he attributes the datum
to a reality external to the abode of his datum.

But this is nothing

S9

more nor less than a magnanimous idealism.

He has no right to accept

as known or knowable the extramental world, but he does to be in good stand•
ing with his critics.
Perceptionism has weathered the storms of many centuries.
cause its explanation of reality conforms with reality.

Why! Be•

It takes into

account the facts disclosed by perception and intellection.

Its explan-

ation appeals to and convinces, every normally intelligent human being.
The red apple exists external to the subjective self.

The subject per-

ceives it directly and immediately and apprehends it immediately.
the dAtum nor the process of perception is denied.

Neither

But neither the datum

nor the process of perception is immediately and directly apprehended.
The object of immediate perception is directly and immediately apprehended.
Immediate awareness is of the object.

All humanity attests to this because

that is the manner in which external reality is revealed to it.
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